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HOLD FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
ADDRESS BY SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
Before the
Carolina Forum, The University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Monday, March 13, 1967
8:00p.m. (EST)

(.

CENTRAL CONCERNS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Prior to my coming to Congress a quarter. of a century ago, I
thought my stock of solutions to the questions of foreign policy was
quite adequate.

In fact, as a teacher of history at the University of

Montana, which I was, I had a touch of what Senator Fulbright might call
the arrogance of brain power.

In more common idiom, there were times

when I thought I knew it all.

That, may I say, is a failing common to

exceptional historians, from Herodotus to Schlessinger.
As a new Member of Congress, my background in history was highly
useful.

I also discovered, however, that my knowledge of international

affairs did not go very far.

It did not begin to provide much of an under-

standing, let alone answers, to the critical issues which were emerging
as World War II drew to a close.

In t hose days, most of us in government

suffered from serious i mperfections in our notions of the outside world
and widely-held but unfounded hopes for an automatic postwar peace under
t he United Nations.
We took many wrong tacks- along with the right ones in the course
of our foreign policy.

For many decades to come, historians will be en-

gaged in sorting out t he one fro m t he other.
We made t hem in Europe.

We made mi s takes in As ia.

We made them in t he United Nations.

over t he whole range of emer gi ng new i nt ernat i onal i ssues .

We made them

I, for one, felt
become a student again.
the floor .

y

li ~itations

and recognized t. e

My classroom was Congress, in

~ed

Co~mittec

to
aod on

My extracurricular activity included a great deal of foreign

travel, extensive reading and not a little reflection.
To tnis day, a student I have remained; an expert I urn not; an
teaching is the profession to which, at some point, I may return.

In the

latter connection, I should note that my name is still carried, on leave
of absence, on the roster of the University of Montana .

Moreover, thanks

to a seniority system in college teaching, secood not even to that of the
Congress, I now hold the rank of full Professor of History.
I am constrained to point out that teaching and legislating are
the two outstanding examples in American society of the application of a
major tenet of Confucianism:

that the accumulation of years is to be

equated automatically and unquestioningly with the accumulation of wisdom .
This principle, I know, is insufferable to the young, tolerable to the
middle-aged, and a comfort to those full of years .

At this point in time,

I must confess that I find a system of seniority tolerably comfortable.
For the present , I have no hesitancy in invoking the authority
with which seniority endows me, in order that I may speak to you on what
seems to me to be the central concerns of contemporary American foreign
policy.

Since the end of World Har II, I have watched clusters of inter-

national problems coalesce into these concerns.
whole range of new and tumultuous change.

The problems cover a

They are, in part, ironic by-

products of the immense acceleration of development in science, education
and communication, transportation and other technologies.

They are ex-

pressive of the explosion in population as well as the explosion of nuclear
devices .

They are indicative of the growth of human expectations and,

- 3 hopefully, of huma n enlightenment.

They are problems, however, which

despite these new twists, are still undergirded by the vast heritage of
human ignorance, fear, want, and hostility from which no part of the
globe is free.
The iceberg of change which has moved in international affairs
during the past two decades helps to explain the emergence of the U.N.
and other international organizations.

It is relevant to the social in-

stability and the militarism which have largely followed the ending of
19th century colonial era, notably in Africa.

It is involved in the

Asian catacylsms--the great economic stirrings in Japan, the immense uncertainties which brood over India and Pakistan and the political tidal
waves which, at intervals, have rolled through Chinese society.
The many-sided changes in the human condition during the past
two decades also explain the first military alliance in peacetime between
ourselves and Western Europe as well as the first major military involvements of the United States on the Asian mainland.

They help to explain,

finally, the awakening of this nation to the problems which confront the
world and ourselves as participants in its indivisible destiny.
It used to be that we tended to stand apart and aloof from the
affairs of the rest of the globe.
history which led

Some have called that period of our

up to World War II, the age of isolation.

terization is glib and somewhat misleading.

The charac-

We were not so much isolated

as we were insulated by a fortuitous geographic endowment.

The greater

part of the nation's historic energies, therefore, could, and, fortunately
did, go inward into the development of a rich, ample, and sparsely settled
land.

We had little need or inclination which would stimulate us to

look much beyond this endowment for our needs and--if I may use the term--

for our kicks .

Exce

to sust_ n a l' .... ted c ""iosity

t

a~d

to satisf

a

fe·.r exotic wants, we avci ed an extensiYe overseas pro ection of to,.ric n
power, particularly outside the /estern Hemisp ere .

From a distance, we

were content to bold ourselves up to the rest of the world, on the basis
of great material achievements and the political heritage of the

A~erican

Revolution, as a prime example of the perfectability of the national experience .
Since World

~Jar

II, however , we have found ourselves plunged,

hands, feet, ani head into the mainstream of tne world's affairs.
did not seek this role .

;Je did not want it .

He

Most of us still find the

clothes of a great international power, costly, ill-fitting and uncomfortable .

Nevertheless, we are unable to get out of tnem.

There is even

the probability that some of us have learned not only to tolerate this new
garb, but to like it .
In any event, as a sequel to World \o/ar II, this nation has come
onto the center of the stage of international affairs.

In this leading

role we have expended an immense amount of resources, energy, and money
for a great variety of purposes .

l-Ie have developed all manner of costly

intelligence and informational services .

'·Je have developed tovering

military services whose annual cost is now around $(0 billion .
He have fought one war in Asia, and are now engaged in a second .
We have narrowly missed involvement in several other peripheral clashes
elsewhere.

More than twenty years after ·.,rorld

~Jar

II, we still have some-

thing on the order of agreements for mutual security with 4o or
nations .

~ore

These agreements, in effect, are commitments to military action

everywhere on the globe, except, perhaps, the Antarctic .
air force is on a minutes-alert .

The strategic

Intercontinental and ot.er missiles are

- 5 pre-set for instant retaliatory launching.
navy patrols the seven seas .

Day and night the American

American soldiers are stationed in many

.lations abroadj in Europe and Viet Nam, they number in the hundreds of
thousands .
These far-flung commitments have been questioned f r om time to
time .

In my judgment, it is most proper that pertinent questions be

raised about them .

Not only do they involve great expenditures of public

funds , they carry, at all times , immense implications for the ver y survival
of the nation and civilization .

As I see it, we have undertaken so many

and scattered defense obligations that any need for the simultaneous honoring of a group of these commitments would find us har d- pressed to pr ovide
even a limited response .

For that reason, if for no other, it seems to

me we would be well-advised to look closely at these military commitments
and activities and to weigh carefully their contemporary value .
It would be futile, however, to consider them in a vacuum .
Effective surveillance must relate to the central concerns of our for eign
policy which, presumably, gave r ise to them in the fir st place .

It be-

hooves us to see as clearly as possible whether our understanding of these
concerns is up to date .

It is incumbent upon us to test and test again

the reflexes of our policies not only for adequacy but for excess .
It will serve no useful purpose to continue to measure these
reflexes of policy by the sort of generalities which are expressed by the
terms "isolationism" or "internationalism . " 1iJ hatever may have been the
case years ago, these yardsticks have long since lost their pertinence .
The labels are no guarantee of the efficacy of any course of action or
non- action in international relations .

What is essential is not the name .

What is essential is that the course is timely and adjusts the bonafide
interests of the nation to the realities of the contemporary world .

- 6 I speck ir. all candor
under both

De~ocratic

hen I sa

and Republican

lag behind these realities .

tna~

t ere have been tende.c1 s

ad~~r.istrations

for foreign

olicy to

Until recently, a kind of inertia, for ex-

ample, has existed with regard to one of the central concerns of Acerican
foreign policy--the United States-Soviet confrontation in Europe .

Until

recently, we have been most reluctant to bring ourselves to face, in policy,
the changes which have taken place on that continent .
To be sure, President Eisenhower
restore at least a

me~sure

sou~~t

in his administration to

of civility in the conduct of U. S .-Soviet affairs,

by his personal associations with the leaders of the Soviet Union .

To be

sure, President Kennedy, in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, removed a rigidity
which , for years had decreed that agreements should not be concluded with
the Soviet Union .

It has only been in the last year or two, however, that

as a nation we have begun to explore fully the implications of change in
Europe and to react to its potentialities in terms of our interests and
world peace .
Yet substantial change has been manifest for some time in inner
developments in both Eastern Europe and in Western Europe and between the
two regions.

In Eastern Europe, the immediate postwar isolation from the

West was a severe one .

It was compounded of political and war-born

vendettas, ideological parochialisms , reciporpal fears and the in-turning
of human energy to meet the massive demands of post-war reconstruction .
Especially since the death of Stalin, however! there has been a general
loosening of the ideological and other
Europe .

~

- jackets throughout Eastern

There has also been a growing response on the part of governments

there to consumer needs, the satisfaction of which involves greatly expanded commerce with the non-Communist world .

- 7 As indicative of the breadth of change, communications, travel,
cultural exchange and other contacts have grown rapidly between Eastern
and Western Europe.

The rise of trade levels between the two regions has

been very pronounced, and it should be noted that, Berlin Wall notwithstanding, West Germany leads all other non-Communist nations in commerce
with Eastern Europe.
For those who read the tea leaves of official sociability, moreover, I would call attention to the recent visits of President Podgorny of
the Soviet Union to Italy and the first reception of a Chief of that State
by the Pope, as well as Premier Kosygin's warm receptions in Paris and
London.

One may attach such values as he chooses to these events.

facts of change in Europe, however, speak for themselves.

The

The talk of

war subsides; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard more
clearly on all sides.

The European detente has not only begun, it is

already well-advanced.
Our reaction to change in Europe includes the groundwork of
President Eisenhower and President Kennedy as well as the bridge-building
of President Johnson, all of which I have already mentioned.
What is involved in the latter case is a sustained effort in
the direction of restoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet
Union and a significant reduction in the military rivalry which, wittingly
or unwittingly, could lead to a catastrophic conflict.
A number of significant agreements with the Soviet Union are
already involved in this effort.

They deal with cultural exchanges,

consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer
space.

Negotiations are also anticipated, in the near future, to try to

limit the incredibly costly rivalry of adding successive and reciprocal
"antis" to the ballistic missile systems of each nation.

An attempt is

- 8 also likely to te mede to

re~ove

certai

long-standit.g acd self-1

hindrances in law to our peaceful trade with the Eastern European co

tries .

Many of these measures, of course, involve not only the Preside t
but also action by the Congress and, particularly, by the Senate .

And,

cer tainly , they involve understanding on the part of the people of the
nation .

However, emotions run deep on any question of U. S . relations with

Communist nations, particularly, in the light of the bloody conflict in
Viet Nam .

I am f r ank to say that I have my own reticences about the pursuit

of agreements with nations on one side of the globe, while a war against us
is being waged with their help on the other.

The best judgments we can

obtain, however, tell us that the rejection of the contemplated agreements
with the Soviet Union and Easter n Europe will not make the slightest differ ence in the situation in Viet Nam .

It will, in no way, diminish our

casualties or hasten the conclusion of the conflict .
In those cir cumstances, I do not see that it serves our purposes
to turn our backs on agreements which would otherwise be in the interest
of this nation .

I do not see that we advance the cause of peace by re-

fusing to build mor e stable relations for peace whenever and wherever an
oppor tunity to do so pr esents itself .
Moreover, bridge-building to Eastern Europe is not unrelated to
the possibility of making constructive changes in the North Atlantic Treaty
Or ganization, changes which would also serve the nation•s interests .

For

many years, six divisions of American forces have been consigned to N.A.T .O.
in Western Europe .

These forces and their dependents involve a U. S . mili-

tary establishment in v!estern Europe of well over half a million Americans .
It is an undertaking which represPnts an expenditure of billions of dollars
of public funds each year .

Yet, I would not begrudge one cent of these

- 9 funds if I were persuaded that the six divisions were as essential to peace
in Europe, today, as they were believed to be when dispatched there years
a~.

But is that the case?

I have already mentioned the change in the

general climate in Europe which expresses itself in a rapidly growing trade
anlthe expansion of other friendly relations.

It should also be noted that

within Western Europe, there are obvious doubts about the need for the
maintenance of N.A.T.O. at the strength in which it was previously projected.
Indeed, the French no longer see any requirement for the presence of

u.s.

forces, at least not in France, and they have withdrawn their own detachments from N.A.T.O. Command.

The United Kingdom has reduced its commitment

of men and resources to the Continent and has announced further reductions
unless West Germany is prepared to neutralize the exchange costs of maintaining these forces on the Rhine.

Other Western Europeans to a greater

or lesser degree appear to regard their N.A.T.O. commitments in the same
non-urgent fashion.
It is now very evident that the United States alone has felt
deeply the need to sustain the full military burden of the earlier common
commitment to N.A.T.O.

Our allies in Western Europe are much closer to

the firing line; yet, in a period of unprecedented economic prosperity they
are most unwilling to carry their pledged share.

In effect, the Western

Europeans have made adjustments in their commitments to N.A.T.O. to reflect
over-all changes in Europe and they have made these adjustments unilaterally.
The contrast in performance between ourselves and Western Europe
regarding commitments to N.A.T.O. in my judgment, is becoming almost an
embarrassment.

It moves us apart from the mainstream of European develop-

ments and is likely to become a source of friction on both sides which, in
the end, can only be harmful to the interests of both sides.
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In all frar.k eGs, I find it difficult to ac uiesce ir.
Branch fears for

;~estern

Europe's safety

~hich

than the fear of the Europeans themselves.
lack of dignity in the lengths to
diplomacy .

~hich

&XPC

•ti•

ore obviously far greater

In all

franknes~,

I find some

these fears have carried our

We have begged, badgered and buttered

~·/estern

effort to stimulate a greater contribution to N.A.T.O.

Europe in an

In all frankness,

I did not relish this nation having been placed in the position of

~earing

out its welcome in France .

I should not like to see that experience re-

peated elsewhere in Europe .

Yet it may well be repeated unless there is

a willingness to make timely adjustments .
I have, therefore, joined with 43 other Senators in the introduction of a resolution which recommends to the President that the Executive
Branch make substantial reductions in the present deployment of our forces
in Western Europe .

Personally, I have felt for several years that two or

three rather than six divisions would be more than sufficient to underscore
our adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty .

That figure is in line

~ith

estimates of present need which have been advanced by General Eisenhower
and General Gavin, both of whom have had a long association with this
question .

I find it most difficult to comprehend why two divisions are any

less effective than six in serving notice that we regard the pledge of the
North Atlantic Treaty as binding and our national security as inseparable
from that of the North Atlantic region .

To talk of six divisions as a

manifestation of international resolution and two divisions as an indication
of a revived isolationism is to reveal how irrelevant if not downright misleading these terms have become .
On the other side of the globe, in Asia, there looms another
central concern of American foreign policy .

It is the confrontation with

China, across the littoral states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam .

Almost two decades have passed since the collapse of the national
government on the Chinese mainland and its retreat to the island of Taiwan .
That event, which occurred when most of you were too young for it to be
noticed, was catac,lysmic in its consequences.

It sundered the fabric of

Chinese society and, almost overnight, brought about the disintegration of
a main pillar of postwar American foreign policy.

In the rubble, the watch-

wora became "wait for the dust to settle" before doing anything about China.
Over the years, the cut-off of contact between ourselves and the
Chinese mainland has become, for all practical purposes, total.
do not go there.

Mainland Chinese do not come here.

Americans

There is not only an

absence of personal contact, there is also a complete absence of trade and
communications.

Indeed, of all the nations of the world we alone have not

only maintained a primary boycott for many years but also seek to enforce
a secondary boycott on Chinese exports.
ive have had brief confrontations with Chinese spokesmen on various
issues over the years, notably at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962.
Our sole continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking government, however,
has been the meetings between the U. S . and Chinese Ambassadors in Poland
which have gone on regularly for many years and at which no business of
significance, so far as I am aware, has been conducted.
In short, "waiting for the dust to settle," has remained the
watchword of this nation 's relations with three-quarters of a billion
Chinese through the administrations of three Presidents .
dust has not settled.

In truth, the

The initial hostility between a revolutionary China

for which we had had little sympathy and ourselves was followed almost
immediately by the Korean Conflict in which we became directly engaged in
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military conflict
the islands

~f

~th

the Chinese .

Quemoy and

~~tau

:hereafter cane the

in the Taiwan Straits .

ne~r

c nfli

t

\nd now, there

s

again C')nflict, this time, by proxy in Viet I!am .
Hithin China , during these years there have been momentous events
which have also added to the difficulties ann uncertainties of developing
a cohesive policy towards the Chinese mainland .
nuclear

The Chinese have exploded

devices at Lop Nor in the Hestern Asian desert of Sinkiang .

Recent

ideological conflicts have sent great tremors through the wh le of the inner
political structure of China .

There has been, finally, the great cleavage

in Sino-Soviet revolutionary solidarity which has torn apart almost all of
the relationships between the two giantnetions of the Eurasian Continent .
In the context of these events, it is not surprising that the dust,
for the settlement of which American policy has waited eighteen years, is
heavier than ever .

The obscurity, moreover, is not likely to be dispelled

in the near future .

There is nothing in the recent history of China which

suggests that it

~11

be easier tomorrow than it is today for us to see

clearly a direction for effective policy .
tions

~th

\o/hatever course of :'\merican rela-

China, it will have to be pursued in spite of the dust with which

the situation is covered .
Clear-cut choices cannot be expected to be available to us any
time in the foreseeable future .

On the contrary, American decisions respect-

ing China ffiUst inevitably contain a large measure of subjectivity and prayer.
Ever-present, will be the possibility of error .

These considerations, may

I say, apply not only to what we may do respecting China but to what we do
not do .

The uncertainties end the risks exist no less in the principle of

of non-appr ach to which we have adhered

ver these years of our

ti~es.

- 13 History will someday estimate the contribution of this

principle~-its

addition

to or subtraction from the interests of the United States and the stability
and peace of the \·lestern Pacific .
Under the present approach, for example, we know from a distance
that a great fire rages in the core of Chinese Communism.

The manifestations

are plain in the roars of the Red Guards, in the denunciations and counterdenunciations, in the sudden fall of long-established revolutionaries.

They

are documented in the inflamatory ideographs which are slashed over the
streets and walls of Peking and the other citadels of Chinese Communist power.
They are suggested in the political bewilderment which is seen in coastal
cities and in the provinces along the inner borders of China and other remote
areas.
Indeed, the present turmoil , is such as to make clear that Communist
political control which, for nearly two decades, was held by many to be total
and irreversible and to extend all the way from Moscow to the farthest reaches
of China is actually considerably less than absolute, even in its extension
from Peking to the distant Chinese provinces.
He can also note, from afar, the serious difficulties between the
Soviet Union and China.
cal realm.

The strains have long been explicit in the ideologi-

They have also become increasingly evident in the tension along

the Sino-Soviet frontier which runs for thousands of miles between the two
count ries.

What appears involved here is an expression of the historic pro-

jection of Czarist Russian interests across the Asian mainland towards
Alaska and which, before it receded to more tractable limits, had spread
even as far as California and Hawaii.

This basic Russian projection to the

East persists and rubs against China, at least in border regions of Manchuria ,

- 1

!1ongolia, and in Sinkiang Frovince.

Conversely, an historic Chinese i . t r est

remains in many parts of Soviet Asia

~hich

at least nominal Chinese authority.

The clash of national interests of the

t~o

ties

at various times have been under

nations, in short, is very real and so, too, are the irredentist hostiliit engenders.

~hich

These hostilities have been a major element in the cycle of everincr~asing
Ho~

bitterness in Chinese-Soviet relations over the past few years.

long this cycle will last and how it

~lhatever

~ill

end are matters of conjecture.

the possibilities, if any, of more effective adjustment of our

policies in the light of this and other trends,

ho~ever,

we are inhibited

from their pursuit by our current approach or, rather, non-approach to
mainland China .
Let me turn, finally, to the immediate and over-riding problem of
policy, to the situation in Viet Nam .

Viet Nam affects every other aspect

of our foreign relations and, particularly, the
diminishes our capacity to deal constructively
confrontation in Europe .
the confrontation

~ith

t~o

~ith

central concerns.

It

the United States-Soviet

To put it mildly, it multiplies the problems of

China in Asia .

It is ironic that once again in Viet Nam, as in Korea, a country
so small and remote from our interests as to be outside the range of even
public curiosity a few years ago has become the major preoccupation of the
United States .

It is ironic that, for the second time in a generation,

~e

find ourselves in a devastating war on the borders of China--not

~ith

but

the United

~ith

a people

~ho

have had no tradition of hostility

to~ards

China--

States and who have far more historic reason than do we for mutual hostility
with the Chinese .

- 15 H~w

by the current

deeply we are engaged in this ironic situation is indicated
c~ncentration

of United States military force in Southeast

Asia and, particularly, in Viet Nam.

We have well in excess of 400,000

military personnel on the ground in South Viet !Jam.

There are also approxi-

mately 75,000 men on the 7th Fleet in adjacent waters and 35,000 more in
Thailand with responsibilities that are tied closely into the situation in
Viet Nam.

In short, we have committed to this conflict over 500,000 members

of the Armed Services and materiel and equipment in unprecedented quantities
and this immense consignment is supported by additional military strength
of all kinds on Okinawa, the Philippines, and Guam.
We are in a limited war in which, by becoming deeply engaged, we
have managed to save from collapse the government of South Viet Nam in Saigon.
The objectives of our military engagement are confined entirely to the
southern half of VietNam.

This limited war of limited objectives, never-

theless, has already engaged more American forces than Korea.
more than Korea.

It has incurred plane and helicopter losses greatly in

excess of those in Korea.
Korea.

It has cost

It is a more difficult and dangerous war than

It is a more bitter and barbaric war.

It is a war whose end is not

yet in sight, by military action or by a negotiated diplomatic solution.
That is the reality of the situation in VietNam.
didly it is faced the better off we will be.

The more can-

At this point, the question

of how or why we became involved is moot and so are regrets over our involvement.

In my judgment, the question now is how can this war be ended at the

soonest possible moment in an honorable peace for ourselves and for all
deeply enmeshed in it.

In short, the question is how can it be ended under

honorable circumstances, before the spreading devastation, not only in North

- 16 Viet t'am, but even tu'"'re, in

nuth lie

::am, makes a hideous tr.ockery

he

f

original objective nf helping the Vietnamese people .
I do not believe t hat we can end this war by slogans of "get in or
get out . "

It cannot be ended by personal criticism of the President and

the Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and other leaders of the Administration or members of the Senate, regardless of the positions which they take
on this issue .

I am frank to say that this criticism, at times, goes far

beyond the merely ungracious and borders on the disgraceful .

President

Johnson wants this war ended in an honorable peace and every Senator I khow,
and I know them all, wants the same thing.

If there are differences among

us they a r e differences of understanding, i nterpretation, and method .
In

my

personal view, and I have made it clear many times, the

conflict cannot be terminated in an honorable fashion by a withdrawal of
the United States at this time although an honorable settlement must eventually involve the withdrawal of United States forces .
The only practical avenue which I see open, for the present, is
to seek to mitigate the horror of the conflict and to restrain its spread,
while endeavoring to pursue any avenue , byway, route or whatever, as the
President has sought to do , which might lead to the negotiating table .

That

there has not yet been an initiation of substantial contact for peace is no
argument against the continuance of the effort to make that contact .

There

can be no relaxation until the war is brought to an end in negotiations .
It is essential that we pursue peace in Viet

r~am

in all sincerity and with

all diligence not only because , in this situation, peace has a rational and
moral validity, but also because a prompt settlement is in the interests of
the Vietnamese penple and the interests of the American pe ple .

- 17 I must say, with great regret, that signs of a settlement in the
near future are lacking.
spreading devastation.

There is, instead, the fact of an ugly war of
All the while, the

~pti~ns

alternatives which might lead to negotiations
Many

pr~posals

g~ow

are running out; the
fewer.

have been put forth and many have been explored.

As an example, over the past year or more I have publicly called attention
to these possible easements of the situation and for eventual settlement:
1.

In lieu of aerial bombardment of North Viet Nam,
the sealing off of the borders of the 17th parallel,
through Laos;

2.

A reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis
of the 1954 and 1962 agreements by call of the cochairmen, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union,
or by any participating conferees;

3. An all-Asian conference at Rangoon or Tokyo or any
other suitable location to consider the conditions
of an honorable peace;

4. The inclusion in any peace conference of whatever
belligerents may be necessary to bring about a
termination of the conflict in Viet Nam;

5. An enlargement of the Manila Conference of 1966 into
a follow-up conference, to include friend and foe alike;
6.

A face-to-face meeting of the Secretary of State, Dean
Rusk, and the Foreign Minister of the Peking government
to discuss the restoration of peace in Viet Nam.
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inf~rrned

addi~i~n,

I

French views

Prerr.ier, Prince

f 1 ')Md')rn

h~ve

urged tha

the

clrs~s

consider

n Viet •am and to the views
Sihan uk .

and Mrs . Gandhi be considered .

I have urged that

inn b

~f

the C m dian

he

r0posnls of

I have endorsed various statements of

v

'fhant
he

President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all 0f which have rrade
clear that not only our proposals but ala

th0se of Hanoi and the People's

Liberation Front might provide a basis for settlement .

I have reccmmendcd

that there be not just a cessation of the bombing of t!orth Viet

am but

that all killing stop, nn both sides, in a cease-fire and standfast, on
the ground and in the waters adjacent to Viet l!am as well as over Viet Nam,
to the end that efforts may be made to initiate talks .
In some of these proposals , the President has concurred and has
had them pursued by his diplomats .

All of them, he has had examined and

if they have not been pursued, I Gan only conclude that there have been
sound reasons for not pursuing them .

Suggestions for peace have come from

many sources; the actual pursuit of peace in the past year, however, has
been by diplomacy and, largely, by secret diplomacy .

Indeed, that is the

case even with the efforts of the distinguished Secretary General of the
United Fations , U 'Ihant .

In his attempts to bring about peace in Viet Ham,

U 'Ihant has acted in his personal and diplomatic capacity rather than in his
Secretarial capacity of carrying out organizational decisions of the United
nations .
The fact is that the

u. r . ,

entered into the Vietnamese problem.

as an organization, has not yet
Some limited useoof the U. I . in this

fashion, may I say, was proposed in an address which I delivered at J hns
H pkins University in Iovember,

1966. At the time, it was not sugges ed

- 19 that the United Nat ions be brought directly into the substance of the dispute;
t hat course presents great difficulties because neither North Viet Nam nor
China are member states.

'ihat I did suggest, however, was an entirely

proper and precedented procedural initiative by the United Nations.

The

Security Council can issue, at any time, by majority vote a call to all
belligerents in Viet Nam to convene in its forum.

It would be entirely in

order for an invitation of this kind to include both China and North Viet Nam.
It was further suggested last November that a basis for a negotiated settlement could begin to be sought in a Security Council request to
the International Court for an advisory opinion on the applicability of the
Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.

I am delighted to note, in passing, that

Congress only last week expressed its overwhelming formal endorsement of
these agreements as a basis for a negotiated settlement.
I betray no confidences when I note that, on request, I interruptea
a brief vacation last fall to go to New York for the sole purpose of discussing these two proposals regarding the possible usage of the
with Ambassador Goldberg and the Secretary-General.

u.

N. organizatio

On the basis of these

discussions it seemed preferable at the time that the search for peace then
being actively pursued be continued via the private avenues of diplomacy
rather than in the forum of the Security Council.
That was many weeks and months ago.

In the interim, intense and

many-sided efforts of diplomacy have been exerted through many private
channels to find the key to peace.

Hopes rose during the cease-fires at

the Chris t mas holidays and at Tet, the Oriental New Year.

However, in the

end, diplomacy not only was unable to find a road to negotiations, it was not
able even to bring about an extension of these truces.
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The Pnpe
Secretary-General

ried,
~f

the

The Russian and British leaders

u. .,

r~ve

tried.

~ne

in his diplomatic capacity, has tried.

,uooassador Goldberg has tried countless times.

~~ny

ther diplcma s and

officials of the Executive Branch of the government have tried.
The strenuous efforts of traditi nal diplomacy have been unavailing.

As indicated by recent statements of both Ambassador Goldberg and

U Thant, the slender reed of hope has shriveled.

There is now no immediate

prospect on the horizon, except for the intensification of the conflict.
That, indeed, is already in progress.

The casualties increase; the devasta-

tion grows; the dangers of expanded war multiply.
In the circumstances, it seems to me that a contribution to peace
might well be sought in public from the United Nations as an organization.
The Secretary-General's personal efforts to date have been dedicated a nd
strenuous and he is entitled to the gratitude and support of the entire
world community.

With all due respect, however, there are other resources

for peace inherent in the United Nations , as an organization, which have
gone untapped and untried.

The U. N. does have a responsibility to try to

contribute to the resolution of this conflict.

I

That responsibility is

explicit in the Charter and every member nation, including ourselves,
shares that responsibility by solemn Treaty obligation.
It seems to me that the cause of a peaceful and honorable settlement may possibly be advanced--certainly it cannot be hurt--by modest recourse
at this time to the procedural machinery of the United Nations .

In my judg-

ment, this nation should consider seeking a face-to-face confrontation of
all belligerents at the United Nations .

Following the Korean precedents,

it seems to me eminently desirable that this government give every consideration to a possible initiative which would bring to a vote in the Security
Council two resolutions along the following lines:

- 21 ryne, that the Security Council invite all belligerents, direct

and indirect, including China and North Viet Nam, to participate in an
open discussion of the conflict in Viet Nam and ways and means of ending
it;
Two, that the Security Council request the International Court
to render an advisory opinion on the current applicability of the Geneva
Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agreements may
place on the present belligerents in Viet Nam.
'fhether or not there is much prospect of a positive response from
others in no way lessens the desirability of offering these resolutions in
good faith and bringing them to a vote.

In

my

judgment, an American initia-

tive of this kind serves not only our interests but the interests of peace
in Viet Nam.
Let me conclude, now, by clarifying one point:

the conflict in

VietNam cannot be settled from the Congress or from the campus.

In the

end, if it is to be settled honorably, there is only one Constitutional
officer of your government who can speak for you and for the entire nation
in its foreign relations.

\Vhether we agree with him or not, whether we like

him or not, whether we abhor him or love him, that man is the President of
the United States.
In a government such as ours, a Senator lives with a Constitution,
a constituency, and a conscience.

All three considerations underlie the

suggestions respecting Viet Nam which have been made here today and others
which have been expressed on other occasions.

President Johnson and all

the Presidents who have gone before him have listened to advice from many
sources, including the Senate.
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It is the President, however, who makes the fundamental de isions
of foreign policy .

These decisions are of an immensity which enjoins upon

us all a high respect for the burdens which a President
responsibility
conscience .

~

~t

bear and a

tender to him every support which can be given in good

In the end, these decisions will determine --insofar as it lies

with this nation to determine--the moment of peace in Viet flam and Asia .

